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Abstract
We analyze herein the e¤ects of the human capital adjustment cost on social mobility.
Such an adjustment cost is modeled as a rising marginal cost schedule for augmenting
human capital. We use a general human capital technology, which disentangles the adjust-
ment cost from the depreciation cost of the human capital. Missing credit markets prevent
individuals from equalizing the initial di¤erences in the human capital. We nd that a
higher adjustment cost for human capital acquisition slows down the social mobility and
results in a persistent inequality across generations. On the other hand, a higher rate of
human capital depreciation could increase mobility via a positive e¤ect on new investment.
The quantitative analysis of our model suggests that the human capital adjustment cost
is nontrivial to account for the observed persistence of inequality and social mobility. In
addition, we nd that the government redistribution policy could account for the large
observed variation in estimates of social mobility.
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1. Introduction
It is an open question whether the son of a poor farmer will become a highly
paid executive manager. The evidence during the last two decades is mixed. A large
body of literature documenting intergenerational income elasticity provides disparate
evidence of social mobility. Although Machin (2004) and Clark and Cummins (2012)
argue that there is considerable persistence in the wealth status of households in
England from 1800 to 2012, other papers such as Grawe and Corak (2004) document
considerably faster social mobility. Social mobility is an important issue in macro-
development literature because it is inextricably connected to the intergenerational
persistence of the inequality or dispersion of wealth. If income inequality is persistent,
social or intergenerational mobility is likely to be slower.1 The seminal paper of
Becker and Tomes (1979) draws the conclusion that a stable distribution of income
could be explained by individual and market luck. Their crucial assumption is that
the credit market is perfect, implying that individuals with low wealth and a high
marginal product of capital could borrow from individuals with the opposite trait.
This tends to equalize the di¤erences in wealth. The residual inequality is then
mostly attributed to luck. Since then a considerable body of literature (e.g., Loury,
1981, Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Galore and Zeira, 1993, Benabou, 1996, Mulligan,
1997, Bandyopadhyay and Basu, 2005, Bandyopadhyay and Tang, 2011) has evolved
emphasizing the role of credit market imperfection in perpetuating the inequality.
In this paper we explore the role of the adjustment cost, a relatively ignored
feature of human capital production, on social mobility. The human capital adjust-
ment cost is modeled as a rising marginal cost of augmenting human capital that is
measured in terms of foregone consumption. Such an adjustment cost can arise for
a number of reasons. First, there could be basic human inertia to respond to change
and adjust to new opportunities or a new environment. An example of such inertia is
where adults nd a better job opportunity with higher pay in a region that is remote
1Although social mobility is a broader notion of a change in social status, including occupation,
we use this term narrowly to indicate the intergenerational mobility of wealth where the wealth is
primarily intangible human capital.
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from their home town but due to friends and family ties they are reluctant to move
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2010). Similar sluggish and varied responses to opportunity
are found in the study of Katz et al. (2001) where adults in high poverty inner cities
in the United States respond rather sluggishly to a subsidized move to low poverty
regions; this is known as the Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing (MTO) pro-
gram. Second, a similar adjustment cost could be attributed to market based factors
such as the higher cost of an advanced education compared to primary schooling or a
higher employment adjustment cost as in Hansen and Sargent (1980). We show that
the presence of such an adjustment cost of human capital could impede the process
of social mobility.
We develop a model with missing credit and insurance markets as in Loury (1981),
Galor and Zeira (1993), and Benabou (2000, 2002). Individuals di¤er in terms of
the initial distribution of human capital and productivities, which cannot be hedged
using credit and insurance markets. In this environment, a higher adjustment cost
impedes social mobility through the following transmission channel. When the credit
market is missing, the investment opportunities facing individuals (investment in hu-
man capital or education in our model) are limited to the resources that they have in
hand. Given a production function with private diminishing returns to reproducible
human capital, poor people with lower human capital have a higher marginal product
than rich people. Thus, relative growth potential of poor people is higher. However,
if a human capital adjustment cost is present, this growth of the poor will be im-
peded because they face a higher marginal cost of investment when they try to grow.
Thus, the adjustment cost will slow the process of social mobility leading to a higher
persistence of human capital inequality in the aggregate. The central point of our
paper is to demonstrate that a society facing such a costly adjustment of human
capital could experience persistent inequality and low social mobility measured by
the intergenerational elasticity of income. Although an adjustment cost is a standard
feature in any physical capital production function, quite surprisingly, its role has
been ignored in the inequality and social mobility literature.
Our functional form for the human capital technology is more general compared
to the extant literature (e.g., Benabou, 2000, 2002). We parametrize two major costs
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of human capital acquisition, namely the adjustment cost and the depreciation cost.
The depreciation of human capital could be attributed to the inherent obsolescence
of skills. Using such a general functional form for human capital production, we
also show that a higher depreciation of human capital could expedite social mobility.
This is because a high depreciation of human capital triggers a greater investment in
human capital to replenish the human capital lost due to obsolescence. Incomplete
depreciation of human capital makes social mobility dependent on the history of
inequality. It also enables us to understand intergenerational knowledge transfer
in the spirit of Mankiw et al. (1992). To the best of our knowledge, a human
capital production function allowing for an adjustment cost as well as the incomplete
depreciation of human capital in determining social mobility has not been explored
in the literature.2
In our model, in the spirit of Galor and Zeira (1993), adults receive a warm-
glow utility from investing in their childs education. As in Loury (1981), human
capital is the only form of reproducible capital in the economy and the credit market
is missing. Idiosyncratic productivity shocks, together with an initial di¤erence in
human capital and missing credit markets, give rise to a cross-sectional inequality
that transmits from one generation to another. The absence of credit and insurance
markets prevents agents from mitigating negative idiosyncratic shocks. Unlucky
agents experiencing a negative productivity shock invest less resources in their childs
education, which means that the child inherits less human capital. How quickly the
o¤spring overcomes this disadvantage depends on how costly it is to adjust the human
capital. We develop a novel closed form analytical solution for the endogenous law
of motion of inequality. The key theoretical result is that inequality is persistent
and social mobility is less in economies with a higher human capital adjustment cost
or a lower depreciation cost of capital. In addition, social mobility is less in more
unequal societies. Since inequality is history dependent in our model, social mobility
2Ben-Porath (1967) uses a human capital production function that has a similar tenor to ours.
He explores the implications of the rising marginal cost of investment in human capital. However,
he does not explore the implications of such a rising marginal cost for social mobility, which is the
main theme in our paper.
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also shares the same property.
In our quantitative exercise, we explore how the adjustment cost and depreciation
costs alone can explain the observed social mobility. We nd that the human capital
adjustment cost has nontrivial e¤ects on social mobility and long-run inequality. On
the other hand, the depreciation cost has quantitatively minor e¤ects on these vari-
ables. Our calibrated social mobility parameter is in accordance with the slow social
mobility predicted by Mazumder (2005) and Clark and Cummins (2012). Adding a
redistributive government policy with public funding of education signicantly alters
the calibrated social mobility. A pro-poor public service program expedites intergen-
erational mobility and brings the estimate of intergenerational earnings elasticity on
par with the majority of studies.
Using our adjustment cost model, we also calibrate an adults human capital
response to luck. In the absence of any other estimate of such a response, we target
the response rate of adults in the well-known MTO program (reported by Katz et
al., 2001) where adults are given the opportunity to move away from a high poverty
region. Our adjustment cost model is in accordance with the response rate of adults
to the MTO program. The resulting impulse responses of human capital with respect
to initial luck di¤erences suggest that the social mobility is slower in economies with
higher adjustment costs. These are all consistent with our key theoretical results.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the dynamics
and equilibrium of individual wealth accumulation. Section 3 provides the quanti-
tative analysis of the model. Section 4 studies the distributional dynamics in an
environment with public funding and Section 5 concludes.
3Our key result that higher human capital adjustment costs slow down social mobility is robust
in a more general model environment in an innite horizon, with physical investment and time
allocation decisions. The details are available as a supplementary appendix from the authors.
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2. The model
2.1. Preference and technology
Consider a continuum of heterogeneous households i 2 [0; 1] in overlapping gen-
erations. Each household i consists of an adult of generation t attached to a child. A
child only inherits human capital from its parents and does not make any decisions
as the childs consumption is already included in that of the parents. An adult, at
date t, employs a unit of raw labor and human capital into the production process
that translates into hit e¢ ciency units for the production of nal goods and services
to earn income (yit) using the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
yit = a1'it (ht)
1  (hit)
 (1)
where a1 > 0 is simply an exogenous productivity parameter,  2 (0; 1), ht represents
the aggregate stock of knowledge in the spirit of Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986).4
Individuals are subject to i.i.d idiosyncratic productivity shocks ('it) that drive their
total marginal productivity. The idiosyncratic shock 'it follows the process: ln'it 
N( 2=2; 2). The child at date t behaves as an adult at t+ 1.
2.1.1. Utility function and budget constraint
Agents care about their own consumption and receive a "joy of giving" from the
human capital stock of their children. In other words, the utility of the adult at date
t is given by:5
u (cit; hit+1) = ln cit +  lnhit+1 (2)
where 0 <  < 1 is the degree of parental altruism; hit+1 represents the human capital
of the o¤spring of agent i. At the end of the period, the parents allocate income
4Such a technology basically means that there are private diminishing returns but social constant
returns to human capital.
5The choice of a logarithmic utility function and altruistic agents with a "joy of giving" motive
is merely for simplicity. Also see Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Galor and Zeira (1993), Saint-Paul
and Verdier (1993), and Benabou (2000) for similar settings.
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between current consumption (cit) and saving (sit). The latter is used for investment
in the human capital accumulation of the o¤spring. The budget constraint is thus
given by:
cit + sit = yit (3)
2.1.2. Technology of human capital production
The human capital is the only form of reproducible input in our model. The
stock of human capital inherited by the current adults from their predecessors deter-
mines their state of technological knowledge, which can be modied to advance the
technological frontier. This can be done by investing in education. The production
of the next period human capital (hit+1) takes place with the aid of the parents time
(lit), the parents human capital (hit) and the investment in schooling (sit):
hit+1 = a2 (lithit)
1  ((1  )hit + sit) (4)
where  2 (0; 1),  2 (0; 1) and a2 > 0.
The human capital production function is in the spirit of Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992) and Benabou (2002) except for the inclusion of the depreciation parameter .
The term lithit may be used to capture home schooling in quality time as knowledge-
able parents are better equipped to promote the learning of their children. Without
any loss of generality, we normalize lit to unity.6 In contrast, (1   )hit is used to
capture some inherited component of human capital, which represents the amount
of workable human capital that a child inherits from its parents in the absence of
any new investment. If adults undertake no investment in their childs education,
for instance, unlike Benabou (2000), the child still inherits some workable human
capital in proportion to (1   )hit. Viewed from this perspective, one may think of
1    as the degree of intergenerational spillover of knowledge as in Mankiw et al.
(1992) and Bandyopadhyay and Basu (2005).
6It is straightforward to generalize the model to endogenize time allocation. We do this in an
innite horizon model, which is available in a supplementary appendix.
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The parameter  in the human capital production function (4) is of central interest
in this paper. It determines the curvature of the marginal return to investment
(@hit+1=@sit), which we ascribe to a convex human capital adjustment cost. The
marginal return to investment based on (4) is given by:
@hit+1=@sit = a2= (1   + sit=hit)1  (5)
Figure 1 plots (5), @hit+1=@sit against sit=hit for  = 0:8 (our baseline value in
the calibration later) and  = 0:6.7 Lower  makes the investment return schedule
shift downward with a steeper curvature. This steep decrease in marginal return to
investment due to lower  is ascribed to a higher adjustment cost of human capital. If
 reaches the upper bound of unity, there is zero adjustment cost and the investment
technology reverts to a standard linear depreciation rule. This notion of  as the
degree of the human capital adjustment cost is borrowed from the standard capital
adjustment cost technology used in Lucas and Prescott (1971), Basu (1987), and
Basu et al. (2012).
Figure 1: E¤ect of a change in  on the marginal return to investment
FIGURE 1 HERE
To see more clearly the close connection between  and the adjustment cost, take
the reciprocal of @hit+1=@sit in (5) to get the marginal cost of individual investment
that characterizes the individual specic marginal Tobins q of human capital (qit).
How qit responds to the ith agents e¤ort to augment human capital is a measure of
the adjustment cost. Using (4), qit can be rewritten as:
qit = (hit+1=hit)
(1 )= = (a2) (6)
The elasticity of qit (with respect to hit+1=hit) is (1   )=. A lower  makes the
Tobins q rise more steeply in response to the agents attempt to augment human
7The other two parameters a2 and  are xed at their baseline levels of 1:655 and 0:03, respec-
tively (see Section 3).
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capital. In view of this, hereafter a lower value of  will be interpreted as a higher
adjustment cost of investing in human capital.
Although a lower  drives down the return to investment via the adjustment cost
channel, a lower rate of depreciation of human capital makes the capital long-lasting,
which contributes to a lower marginal return on investment (5). A lower depreciation
cost makes the current generation inherit more human capital from their ancestors
(along with a "joy of giving" bequest), which, as will be seen later, contributes to
slower convergence.
2.2. Initial distribution of human capital
At the beginning, each adult of the initial generation is endowed with human
capital hi0. The distribution of hi0 takes a known probability distribution,
lnhi0  N(0; 20) (7)
and it evolves over time along an equilibrium trajectory.
2.3. Equilibrium
In equilibrium, all individuals behave optimally and the aggregate consistency
conditions hold.
Optimality: An adult of cohort t solves the following problem, obtained by
substituting (2) and (4) into (3),
max
sit
n
ln (yit   sit) +  ln ((1  )hit + sit)
o
(8)
taking hit as given. The optimization yields the following investment function,
sit = (yit   (1  )hit) = (1 + ) (9)
An adults optimal investment decision constitutes new investment plus a replace-
ment of depreciated capital. A lower rate of depreciation depresses current invest-
ment because the adult carries forward human capital from the previous generation.
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Note that, in general, such models allow disinvestment (sit  0), in which case
some adults could consume more than their income at the expense of depleting the
human capital of their children.8 Nevertheless, the optimal human capital of the
o¤springs always remains positive in our model.9
Aggregate Consistency: (i) ct 
R
citdi, st 
R
sitdi, yt 
R
yitdi, ht 
R
hitdi
where the left-hand side variable in each of them means the aggregate. (ii) The
aggregate budget constraint is thus given by:10
ct + st = yt (10)
2.4. Individual optimal human capital accumulation
From (1), (4), and (9), the ith individual optimal human capital accumulation is
given by,
hit+1 = hit
 
1   + a1'ith1 t h 1it

(11)
where
  a2 (= (1 + ))
Thus, the ith individual o¤springs optimal human capital, which is always positive,
is determined by both the depreciation and adjustment cost of human capital and
the parental income.
8Real life examples of human capital disinvestment include child abuse or sending ones o¤spring
to work as child labor in less developed countries without undertaking any investment in schooling.
This could arise in the model if adults are very myopic (low ) or if the total factor productivity
(TFP) is too low.
9See eq. (11). Also, in our calibration exercise (Section 3), the extreme scenario of disinvestment
in children does not arise for plausible parameter values.
10We use the operators
R
and E interchangeably in the text to denote aggregation across indi-
viduals.
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2.5. Incomplete depreciation, adjustment cost, and social mobility
Loglinearizing (11) around a balanced growth path where all agents are identical
in terms of luck (ln'it = ln' = 0), one gets a clear picture about the evolution of
individual human capital.11
lnhit+1 ' % lnhit +  ln'it (12)
where
%  1  (1  ) 2 (0; 1) (13)
  a1= (1   + a1) 2 (0; 1) (14)
Eq. (12) implies that, around a balanced growth path, children inherit human capital
related traits from their parents to the extent of %. The inverse of % is often considered
as the measure of social mobility (e.g., Benabou, 2002). A larger value of % indicates
a slower social mobility. A lower depreciation rate (lower ) and a higher adjustment
cost (lower ) raise % and thus imply a slower social mobility.
2.6. Distributional dynamics
We are now ready to characterize the dynamics of the cross sectional variance of
human capital:
Proposition 1. Given the initial cross sectional inequality characterized by (7) and
(11), the dynamics of inequality and growth are given by the following laws of motion,
respectively,
2t+1 = 
2 ln
2 exp ( 22t ) + (a1)
2 exp ((0:5! + 2)2t + 
2) + 2a1 exp ((0:5! + =)
2
t )
(+ a1 exp (0:5!2t ))
2
(15)
11Algebraic derivation is omitted for brevity and is available from the authors upon request.
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and
t+1 = ln+ 0:5 (1=   1)
 
2t   2t+1

+  ln
 
+ a1 exp
 
0:5!2t

(16)
where
t+1  lnht+1   lnht; 2t = var(lnhit)
  1  ,   1= +   1 > 0
!  (  1) (2= +   2) < 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
The dynamics of inequality is thus determined by its own history as seen from
(15). Although inequality is not inuenced by the growth rate of the economy, growth
depends on the current and past inequality. This is evident from the fact that 2t+1
is a function of 2t alone whereas t+1 depends on 
2
t+1 and 
2
t .
2.6.1. History dependent social mobility
The social mobility based on the exact solution is the inverse of the gradient of
(15). This gradient is given by, (see the Appendix for details of the derivation),
%2t  @2t+1=@2t = f
 
2t

(17)
The exact solution for social mobility (17) reveals a path dependence property.
It depends on the current state of inequality, 2t , which is history dependent as
seen in (15). Figure 2 plots %t against 2t for alternative values of the depreciation
parameter . In line with Clarks (2013) empirical nding, social mobility is less
in a more unequal society.12 Incomplete depreciation discourages new investment in
human capital and prevents the new generation from overcoming the initial deciency
of human capital. Thus, initial inequality slows down current social mobility. Lower
depreciation impedes mobility for all inequality states as seen by the comparison
(when  = 0:2,  = 0:03 and  = 1). It is noteworthy that for full depreciation
12See Figures 1 and 2 of Clark (2013).
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( = 1), this mobility loses its history dependence property. In this case, %t reduces to
a constant, % = 1 (1 ). Because (11) is loglinear when  = 1, the loglinearization
and the actual solution converge.
Figure 2: Social mobility versus inequality
FIGURE 2 HERE
Taking the variance of the loglinear version in (12), one clearly sees the roles 
and  play on the dynamics of inequality of the economy:13
2t+1 = %
22t + 
22 (18)
Eq. (17) reduces to (18) when  = 1. Combining (1) and (18) gives the following
dynamics of income inequality (2y;t):
2y;t+1 = %
22y;t + 
2
 
1  %2 + 22 (19)
The individual capital share parameter, , and the adjustment cost parameter, ,
have opposing e¤ects on the persistence of inequality. When  is higher, the relative
growth potential of the poor with respect to the rich (due to the poors higher mar-
ginal product) is dampened, which means that the process of convergence between
the rich and the poor will be slower. This explains why the initial inequality tends
to persist when  is higher.14 On the other hand, a higher adjustment cost (lower )
will make the process of convergence between the poor and the rich slower because it
is costly for the poor to invest. This technological disadvantage imposed by the hu-
man capital adjustment cost is compounded by the credit market imperfection that
13Because of its highly nonlinear nature, it is di¢ cult to ascertain the comparative statics e¤ects
of the four underlying parameters. We study them numerically in the next section. The numerical
comparative results are in accordance with the loglinearized version.
14The inverse relationship between the rate of convergence and the capital share parameter is
well known in the convergence literature (see for example, Benabou, 2002).
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makes the social mobility slower and inequality more persistent.15 These e¤ects of 
and  on the social mobility are remarkably robust to alternative environments.16
On the other hand, a lower depreciation rate makes the inequality process more
persistent by depressing current investment because the adult carries forward human
capital from the previous generation, as shown in eq. (9). A greater depreciation
or obsolescence of human capital promotes more investment in schooling.17 Since
investment is the only vehicle for social mobility, lower investment in human capi-
tal caused by low depreciation slows this process of social mobility and makes the
inequality more persistent. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2. A higher degree of adjustment cost (lower ), lower depreciation
cost (), and a higher capital share  make the social mobility slower and the in-
equality process more persistent.
2.7. Long-run inequality and growth
The steady-state inequality and growth based on the closed form solutions (15)
and (16) are given by the following expressions, respectively:
2 = 2 ln
2 exp ( 22) + (a1)
2 exp ((0:5! + 2)2 + 2) + 2a1 exp ((0:5! + =)
2)
(+ a1 exp (0:5!2))
2
(20)
and
 = ln+  ln

+ a1 exp
 
0:5!2
	
(21)
The steady-state equivalents based on the log-linearized version of the model have
simpler expressions. Considering (18),
15When  is close to unity, the adjustment cost ceases to play any role in determining the
inequality persistence because the poor do not have any relative advantage in terms of higher
marginal product.
16In a supplementary appendix (available from the authors upon request) we have worked out a
model with dynastic altruism, as in Barro (1974) and derive the same results.
17There are two principal drivers of human capital depreciation: (i) technical obsolescence and
(ii) economic obsolescence. See Rosen (1975), de Grip and van Loo (2002), and de Grip (2006) for a
discussion on human capital obsolescence. The former is due to changes that originate in individuals
personal circumstances such as ageing, illness, injury while technological progress accounts for the
latter.
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2 = 22=
 
1  %2 (22)
The steady-state income inequality (2y) based on (19) is:
2y = 
2
 
1  %2 + 22 =  1  %2 (23)
Note that when  = 1, all of the loglinearized and the exact solutions converge.18
Thus, inequality in the long-run is mainly the result of individualsdi¤erences in
human capital investment decisions in response to di¤erences in luck.
3. Quantitative analysis
In this section, we evaluate the quantitative e¤ects of  and  on social mobility
and inequality dynamics based on our model. We rst construct parameter values
that reasonably reect actual economies. Assuming a psychological discount factor
of 0:96, we set  = 0:9630  0:3, in a period of 30 years (de la Croix and Michel,
2002, p.255).19 The choices of 2 = 0:42, a1 = 1:96 and a2 = 1:655 are made to
target the variance of log of income (2y) equal to 0:4386 and a long-run annual
average growth rate of about 1:94 percent for the US economy.20 Regarding , we
take Glomms (1997) estimate of 0:8 as a baseline. The baseline value of  is taken
from Mankiw et al. (1992). The intergenerational wealth or earning elasticity (%)
is very sensitive to the choice of . We x a value of  equal to 0:3, which gives a
baseline calibrated estimate of social mobility of 0:6254: This estimate falls within
the range of the Mazumder (2005) and Clark and Cummins (2012) estimates.21. This
18For instance, the steady-state inequality in both (20) and (22) will reduce to 2 =
2= ((1  ) (2  (1  ) )).
19A psychological discount factor of 0:96 matches a 4:17 percent rate of time preference  in an
innite horizon. That is,  = 1= (1 + ) = 1=(1 + :0417) = 0:96.
20Assuming a lognormal distribution of income, the mean-median ratio implies a 0:44 average
log-income variance for the United States for the years 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000 based on the
Luxembourg Income Study (UNU-WIDER, 2007).
21Mazumder (2005) estimates the intergenerational elasticity for the United States at about 0:6.
He argues that the earlier estimates of intergenerational elasticity are downward biased by more
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estimate is still on the low side but we take it as our initial baseline estimate. In the
next section we introduce a redistributive government policy that would bring the
social mobility estimate more into line with the median estimate in the literature.
Our calibrated model also has implications for the human capital elasticity with
respect to luck, , which is an indicator of an agents response to luck or opportu-
nity. We use the response rate of households from the well known MTO program as
reported by Katz et al. (2001) as a proxy for the agents response to luck. Katz et
al. (2001) report that about 48% to 62% of households living in high poverty regions
in Boston move through the MTO program.22 Using the above calibrated values,
we get an estimate for this response to luck of around 0:54, which is in the range of
Katz et al.s (2001) study. This provides some additional credence to our calibrated
structural parameters. Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter values.
Table 1: Benchmark values
Preference and technology parameters  = 0:3, a1 = 1:96, a2 = 1:655
Production and policy parameters  = 0:3,  = 0:8,  = 0:03
Inequality parameter 2 = 0:42
Tables 2 and 3 report the sensitivity analysis of social mobility % with respect to
changes in  and  around the baseline values. A higher adjustment cost and lower
depreciation cost (lower  and , respectively) slow down social mobility (leading to
higher %).
than 30% due to persistent transitory uctuations. On the other hand, Clark and Cummins (2012)
get % estimates between 0:7 and 0:8 for the United Kingdom.
22The MTO program in Boston was a housing mobility programme in which low-income families
in the inner city in Boston were given assistance (vouchers) to move to less segregated regions and
low poverty regions. Katz et al. (2001) report the results of a randomized control trial experiment.
The share of MTO-Boston families in their sample who used the voucher (which they refer to as the
"take-up rate") ranged from 48% to 62%. We take this response as a proxy for an agents response
to luck. A higher response is deemed to be an indicator of greater mobility.
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Table 2: E¤ects of adjustment cost on inequality, mobility, and growth
Adjustment cost () %
0:9 0.5786
0:85 0.6020
0:8 0.6254
0:75 0.6488
0:7 0.6722
0:6 0.7190
Table 3: E¤ects of depreciation cost on inequality, mobility, and growth
Depreciation cost () %
0:2 0.6023
0:15 0.6094
0:13 0.6122
0:10 0.6162
0:05 0.6228
0:03 0.6254
0:01 0.6279
Figure 3 examines the inequality dynamics based on the closed form solution
(15) with respect to the key parameters  and . It demonstrates the e¤ects of
changes in adjustment and depreciation costs on the distributional dynamics. Given
the baseline values of other parameters, a higher adjustment cost (or a decrease in
 from 0:8 to 0:6) slows down the social mobility by about 4 generations. A lower
rate of depreciation (by 2%) slows down the convergence but its quantitative e¤ect
is rather small.
Figure 3: Adjustment and depreciation costs with inequality dynamics
FIGURE 3 HERE
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3.1. Luck, initial inequality, and social mobility
Are children poor due to bad luck or poor parents? Both adjustment and de-
preciation costs play important roles in determining how inequality transmits across
generations through past episodes of luck and initial conditions. To see this, do the
same as (12) for the jth individual and subtract it from (12) to get
hit+1=% (hit) +  ('it) (24)
where hit+1  lnhit+1   lnhjt+1, hit  lnhit   lnhjt and 'it  ln'it   ln'jt.
Eq. (24) reects the relative human capital evolution of the ith and jth households.
When the capital market is incomplete, the di¤erence in initial human capital of
the rst generation as well as the di¤erence in luck play a central role in transmitting
initial inequality through generations. The rst term in (24) shows the e¤ect of a
di¤erence in the human capital of the parents while the second term captures the
e¤ect of the parentsluck on the wealth inequality of their children. The di¤erences
in both initial human capital and luck transmit through the generations. How they
impact future generations depends on the parameters % and , which in turn depend
on the structural parameters. The initial di¤erence in wealth has a decaying e¤ect
on the wealth di¤erence of successive generations. The rate of decay is determined
by % 2 (0; 1). A larger % makes the initial inequality have a persistent e¤ect and thus
slows down social mobility. It is easy to verify that % is larger if the adjustment cost
is higher (lower ) or the depreciation cost () is lower.
On the other hand, the parentsluck has an immediate impact on the di¤erence in
wealth of their children through the optimal investment function (9). This inequality
transmits to the future generations through the adjustment of the human capital
stock. If it is costly to adjust the human capital, the luck e¤ect of the parents could
persist over generations. To see this, we start from a steady-state where all agents
are identical in terms of human capital and let the initial generations experience a
di¤erence in luck (say, the ith family enjoys some good luck and the jth family su¤ers
from some bad luck). Figure 5 plots (24) the impulse responses of a 0:1 standard
deviation di¤erence in such luck on the time path of dynastic inequality for two values
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of the adjustment cost parameters ( = 0:8 and  = 0:6). When  = 0:8 convergence
occurs after 7 generations whereas it takes about 10 generations to converge when
 = 0:6. An adult reacts 1.3 times more in response to luck when  = 0:8 as opposed
to  = 0:6: This reinforces our earlier result that a higher adjustment cost slows
down social mobility because of a sluggish response to luck by adults.
Figure 4: E¤ect of di¤erence in luck on human capital when  = 0:6 and  = 0:8
FIGURE 4 HERE
4. Redistribution policy, adjustment cost, and social mobility
Our baseline estimate of social mobility in Table 2 suggests that the social mo-
bility is rather slow. Tamura et al. (2014) present a wide range of estimates of in-
tergenerational elasticity of earnings based on the extant literature. In this section,
we show that a redistribution policy could signicantly expedite intergenerational
mobility.
Assume that the human capital production is partly funded by the government.
This is in fact more consistent with the empirical evidence that in most industrialized
countries, education funding comprises public and private resources. For instance,
in the United Kingdom, until recently, more than a third of universitiestotal fund-
ing came from the government.23 Let the government levy a at tax rate of  on
the total output and provide a gt bundle of public services to households. Suppose
that the use and e¢ ciency of the public resource is not identical among households.
Depending on its type, a given public service could benet certain households more
than proportionally. It could disproportionately benet the poor due to their lack
of access to its private substitutes or it may benet the rich more because of their
access to complementary inputs for human capital production. For example, Internet
provision by the public sector may disproportionately benet those individuals who
own a laptop computer. On the other hand, a provision of public transport or free
23BBC, June 27, 2011.
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meals in school may benet the poor more than proportionally because they lack
these basic inputs.
Based on these premises, the ith individuals human capital production function
(4) is formulated as follows:
hit+1 = h
1 
it

g
(1 )
it s

it

(25)
We assume here the complete depreciation of human capital,  = 1, without loss of
generality.24
The parameter 1   represents the government intensity in the education sector,
which we call government bias in education following Basu and Bhattarai (2012).25
For example, if  = 1, the government plays no role in the education sector, which
means that the government bias is zero in which case (25) reverts to (4). As in
Getachew (2010), we assume that the public good technology takes the following
form:
git =
gt
hit
(26)
The sign of the parameter  features the redistributive nature of the public service.
If  > 0 ( < 0), such a public good technology basically means that for a given gt
an individual with low (high) hit receives greater public good. In other words, the
government program is pro-poor (pro-rich), meaning that public funding benets the
poor more than the rich. The case  = 0 implies a neutral public policy. In this
case, the provision of a public service has equal e¤ects on both the rich and the
poor because all receive the same gt. The size of  characterizes the extent of the
redistribution.
The government has a balanced budget, which means that the government im-
poses a at rate () tax on aggregate output to nance its public spending. In other
24Recall that depreciation has a minor quantitative e¤ect on social mobility. Also, we let a1 =
a2 = 1 for simplicity without any loss of generality.
25Basu and Bhattarai (2012) employ a slightly di¤erent human capital technology that involves
schooling time, whereas in our present model there is no time allocation.
20
words,
gt = yt (27)
Given that we have a heterogenous agent economy where individuals di¤er in
terms of productivity and human capital, we need to aggregate individual income
levels to arrive at yt. From (1), using the lognormal distributional property, it is easy
to verify that
yt = hte
1
2
2t ( 1) (28)
Given that 0 <  < 1 and @ ln yt=@2t < 0, inequality and income negatively covary.
Due to the diminishing returns to capital (1), the poor have a relatively higher
marginal product of capital than the rich. Due to the missing credit market, they
cannot borrow from the rich to undertake Pareto optimal investment. Therefore,
a higher inequality leads to a greater ine¢ ciency as it reects missing productive
opportunities.
Plugging (28) into (27) we get,
gt = hte
1
2
2t ( 1) (29)
Since inequality reduces aggregate income (yt), the public fund (gt) goes down pro-
portionally in a more unequal economy.
4.1. The optimal tax rate
We next solve the optimal tax rate for this economy. Households solve optimiza-
tion problems in two steps. In the rst step, they solve the optimal investment and
consumption assuming the public spending is given exogenously. In the next step,
they solve for their preferred tax rate.
Substituting (26) into (25), we obtain the individualshuman capital accumu-
lation function that takes into account the disproportionate government funding of
education,
hit+1 = h
(1 (1+(1 )))
it g
(1 )
t s

it (30)
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Thus, in the rst step, the ith households optimization problem based on (2),
(3), and (30) is given by,
max
sit,
n
ln (yit (1  )  sit) +  ln

h
(1 (1+(1 )))
it g
(1 )
t s

it
o
(31)
The rst order condition is,
sit = yit
 (1  )
1 + 
(32)
Because of the public funding of education, private investment in schooling decreases
with government bias 1   and  .
In the second step, the adult solves the preferred tax rate as follows:
max

n
ln (1  )+1 + ln  ((1 ))
o
(33)
which yields the optimal tax rate,
 =
 (1  )
1 + 
(34)
Given similar preferences, each individual chooses the same tax rate.26 Not surpris-
ingly  is proportional to the "government bias" (1  ). On the other hand, the
preferred tax rate is lower if the adjustment cost is high ( i.e.,  is small). Since
the government spending complements the human capital production and the higher
adjustment cost is a tax imposed by mother nature on human capital production,
all individuals desire that the government should tax them less for the provision of
public goods to aid human capital.
From (1), (29), (30), (32), and (34), the optimal human capital accumulation
under the public funding that is associated with the ith individual is given by,
hit+1 = 1 (hit)
%1 ('it)
1 (ht)
1 e
1
2
2t 2 (35)
26See also de la Croix and Michel (2002, p. 264) for a similar optimal tax result where all
individuals choose the same tax rate.
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where
1 

 (1  )
1 + 

   (36)
and
%1  1   (1   +  (1  )) (37)
1   (38)
1   (1  ) + (1  )  (39)
2  (  1) (1  ) < 0 (40)
where  is given by (34).
4.2. Estimates of social mobility in the presence of a redistribution policy
The intergenerational elasticity of earnings is now modied to %1 in (37), which
incorporates the redistributive policy () and government bias (1  ). According to
Tamura et al. (2014), Table 3, %1 ranges from 0.158 to 0.535. However, Tamura et al.
(2014) do not include the estimates of social mobility of Clark and Cummins (2012)
and Mazumder (2005). If we include their estimates, the range of intergenerational
earning elasticity widens to (0.158, 0.8). This wide zone of disagreement about social
mobility could be due to alternative sampling designs, estimation methodology, and
various other factors. However, in the context of our adjustment cost model with a
redistribution policy, a reasonable question to ask is whether a redistribution policy
could provide any additional insights into the observed di¤erences in social mobility.
We use the Basu and Bhattarai (2012) estimate of the mean government bias
1   , which is equal to 0:07 based on 166 countries. We take this as a baseline
estimate of government bias and x  = 0:8 and  = 0:3 as in our earlier calibration.
Next, we compute a range for the redistributive parameter  that could reproduce
the %1 estimate in the range (0:158 to 0:8). Table 4 reports the results. For a value
of  equal to 1:5, we come close to the median estimate of intergenerational earning
elasticity used by Tamura et al. (2014). As expected, a larger  means greater social
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mobility. The value of  ranges from 4:7 to  7 to reproduce the empirical range of
social mobility. In other words, our model predicts that with everything else being
equal, greater social mobility may be due to a pro-poor redistribution policy.
Table 4: E¤ects of redistributive policy on social mobility
Redistributive Policy () %1
4:7 0.16
3 0.25
2 0.31
1:5 0.34
0 0.42
 1 0.47
 3 0.59
 5 0.7
 7 0.81
This numerical exercise has to be interpreted with caution. Given the stylized
nature of the model, it may not account for all the factors that are important for
social mobility. Notwithstanding this caveat, our model identies a set of structural
parameters that could provide some insights into mobility. The central focus of
the model is the adjustment cost parameter in determining the degree of social
mobility, which is novel in the literature. The model also explores the roles played
by the depreciation rate and the redistribution policy parameters in reproducing an
empirically plausible social mobility.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the e¤ects of the human capital adjustment cost on
social mobility using a model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents.
Although the adjustment cost is a standard feature in a physical capital production
function, its role is not well explored in growth models with human capital. The
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adjustment cost of human capital is important because of the inherent inertia of
agents to respond to new opportunity, which is well documented in the literature.
We use a more general functional form for human capital production that identies
the adjustment cost and the depreciation cost of human capital. Our human capital
production function allows for the incomplete depreciation of human capital, which
is ignored in the extant literature. A higher adjustment cost of human capital slows
down social mobility by escalating the marginal cost of investment. Slower depreci-
ation of human capital also contributes to sluggish mobility because it discourages
new investment in schooling and through this channel it makes social mobility history
dependent. The quantitative analysis of our model suggests that the human capital
adjustment cost has nontrivial e¤ects on social mobility and inequality. Our adjust-
ment cost model, in conjunction with a pro-poor redistribution policy, gives rise to
a calibrated social mobility on par with that shown in the literature. As mentioned
previously, the key result that a higher human capital adjustment cost slows down
social mobility is robust in a more general model environment. A future extension
of this work would be to bring in endogenous occupational choice and explore the
implications on the adjustment cost for occupational mobility.
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Appendix
Outline of the derivation of (15) and (16)
This appendix provides an outline of the derivation of these two key equations.
More technical details can be found in a supplementary appendix available from the
authors upon request.
Rewrite (11) as
(hit+1)
& = &
 
h&it+ t'ith
{+&
it

(A.1)
where &  1=, {    1,   1  , and t  a1h1 t .
Given the lognormality assumption of 'it and hit;
ln'it  N( 2=2; 2) (A.2)
lnhit  N(t; 2t ) (A.3)
for any constant x, note that
ln (hit)
x  N(xt; x22t ) (A.4)
This also implies,
E [(hit)
x] = (ht)
x e0:5
2
t x(x 1) (A.5)
var [(hit)
x] = (ht)
2x e
2
t x(x 1)

ex
22t   1

(A.6)
Applying (A.5) and (A.6), aggregate (A.1) as follows:
h&t+1e
0:5&(& 1)2t+1 = &h&te
0:5&(& 1)2t
n
+ a1e
0:5{(2&+{ 1)2t
o
(A.7)
One can easily compute (16) now from (A.7).
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To derive the distributional dynamics, take the variance from both sides of (A.1),
var [(hi;t+1)
& ] = 2&

2 var [h&it] + 
2
t var

'ith
&+{
it

+ 2t cov
 
h&it; 'ith
&+{
it

(A.8)
which, after further manipulations, and using (A.5), (A.6), and (A.7) yields:
e
 22t+1 =
2e
 22t + (a1)
2

e(!+
2)2t+2

+ 2a1

e(0:5!+=)
2
t

 
+ a1e0:5!
2
t
2 (A.9)
where
!  (  1) (2= +   2) < 0,   1= +   1 > 0
as given by (15).
The exact social mobility parameter, %t, is derived by simply taking the rst
derivative of (A.9):
%2t  @2t+1=@2t
=

2 2 exp( 22t ) + (a1)
2b1b2 exp(b2
2
t ) + 2a1b3 exp(b3
2
t )
2 exp( 22t ) + (a1)2b1 exp(b22t ) + 2a1 exp(b32t )
  a1! exp(0:5!
2
t )
+ a1 exp(0:5!2t )

2
where
b1  exp
 
2

, b2  ! + 2, b3  0:5! + =:
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Figure 1: E¤ect of a change in  on the marginal return to investment
Figure 2: Social mobility versus inequality
1
Figure 3: Adjustment and depreciation costs, with inequality dynamics.
Figure 4: E¤ect of a di¤erence in luck on human capital when =0.6
and =0.8
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